makes it his or her business to copy and sell another person's intellectual product, such as a program, or an audio or video recording. Public policy remedies typically attempt to stop this from occurring through various legal means (laws, enforcement, penalties, international agreements for prosecution, etc.). This not what our paper is about. The second type of violation occurs when someone duplicates or purchases intellectual property strictly for personal use. Otherwise honest citizens have been found to constitute a significant market for stolen intellectual property (Cromwell, Olson and Avary 1993) . Henry (1978) , who studied property crimes committed by ordinary people, observed that taking and using stolen intellectual property is an "everyday feature of ordinary people's lives." Such transgressions at the individual level have profound consequences when they become a mass phenomenon, such that in 1997, then-President Clinton signed the "No Electronic Theft Act," which makes sharing software with friends or family memberseven when there's no profit involved -a federal felony.
The Effect of Cost Structure
So what makes someone who would never consider departing a restaurant without leaving a tip or keeping a package that they received inadvertently, decide to risk the legal and other potential negative repercussions of duplicating software and music without paying? We propose that the inclination to pay for a certain types of goods and services is greater than for other types, and what distinguishes the two classes is their "cost structure." We use the term cost structure to describe the composition of a product's cost: whether it is comprised principally of fixed costs or variable costs. The fixed costs (FC) are the up-front costs, which include capital expenditures such as research and development, buildings and equipment. These costs typically do not vary with the number of units produced. The variable costs (VC) are those costs ascribed to producing a single unit of the product above and beyond the FC, and typically include such things as raw materials, packaging and direct labor.
Our central thesis is that consumers feel less obligated and are less likely to pay voluntarily for a product that entails high FC and low VC (e.g., software) as compared to a product with a high VC and low FC (e.g., jewelry), holding total cost and average cost (AC) constant. Our reasoning is as follows. First, consumers are less likely to pay for a product the less harm they believe the seller would incur from their failure to pay. In general, consumers consider reciprocity and equity in any exchange, including purchases (Bagozzi 1975) . The amount people feel obliged to pay is affected by what they perceive to be the gain-loss ratio of both exchange partners (i.e., buyer and seller) and their efforts to achieve equity in the exchange (Walster et al. 1978) . If consumers feel that they are paying less than what the seller has expended, they will feel they are harming the vendor by causing him to incur a loss. In this way, the risk of feeling guilty or the potential emotional repercussions of not paying often outweigh the other uncertainties associated with purchase. Therefore, the effect of cost structure on payment intentions is mediated by considerations of responsibility and evenhandedness.
Second, consumers believe that they do less harm when their failure to pay prevents a seller from recovering FC than when it prevents a seller from recouping VC. This is partly due to the fact that a product's FC is not easily attributable to individual consumption and consumers are prone to see amounts paid in excess of VC as a gain to the seller. Conversely, failing to cover the seller's VC would be seen as inflicting a loss onto the seller. According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) foregone gains and losses are evaluated differently. A loss of a particular magnitude has a larger negative utility than a foregone gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . In other words, consumers would perceive the chance of inflicting harm as greater when they fail to contribute to VC (a loss) than when they fail to contribute to FC (a foregone gain). 1 Consequently, consumers are less inclined to pay for products with a relatively large FC component and small VC component than vice-versa, all else equal. In this way, payment and purchase intentions often depend on a product's perceived cost structure. This hypothesized relationship is shown in Figure 1 .
__________________________
Insert Figure 1 here __________________________ To date, little work has been done to explore how consumers perceive costs, much less how inferences regarding costs can influence price perceptions and buyer behavior, despite cost-plus pricing being routine at many firms (Cyert and March, 1963; Levy & Weitz, 1998) . 2 When judging the appropriateness of current prices, the existing research in marketing typically assumes consumers rely on past or current shelf prices within a category (Briesch et al. 1997, Rajendran and Tellis 1994) , and in turn use current prices to forecast future prices (Jacobson and Obermiller 1990) . Other research (e.g., Nunes and Boatwright 2002 , Winer 1986 , Kalwani et al. 1990 ) has documented the effect of contextual factors on price perceptions and willingness to pay, such as the prices of unrelated, alternative products, a brand's market share, the frequency of promotion and various store characteristics. This is the first research we know of to examine the effect of perceived costs, and in particular "cost structure," on buyer behavior.
Software is just one example of a product that possesses a cost structure with a relatively low VC and high FC. A music CD that sells for $15.99 or more often has a VC less than $1, but promotional expenses and other FC that are quite high. Likewise, an author may be paid millions to write a book that costs pennies to print, and medicine that costs little to manufacture per pill usually involves extensive investments in research and development as well as sales support and marketing. According to Harvard Doctor Lester Grinspoon (Newsweek 1999), R&D for each new drug can cost upwards of $300 million, yet only about one in five ever make it to market. Numerous other products such as board games, fashion apparel, and luxury items like perfume have relatively low per-unit costs, but high fixed costs. Most service businesses (e.g., telecommunications, hotels, banks, car washes) consist of a relatively low VC and high FC (Guiltinan 1987) . Now consider the relatively high VC and low FC associated with customized or unique goods or services that require intense amounts of labor, such as handcrafted furniture, commissioned artwork and automobile restoration. Products such as jewelry, quality leather goods, computers and a host of packaged goods for which expensive materials make up the bulk of the cost, have relatively high VC compared to their FC. 3 From the perspective of the manufacturer or seller, however, cost is cost, be it fixed or variable. Like VC, the FC is the cost of doing business and must be recouped if profits are to be made. A product's Average Cost (AC) includes the VC plus an amortized portion of the FC, and is the minimum amount that needs to be charged to the consumer in order not to lose money. Any firm that prices below AC cannot stay in business in the long-term (Tellis 1986 ). However, as our research points out, consumers do not always perceive costs this way, effectively reducing a product's perceived "cost" from its AC towards its VC and avoiding responsibility for helping a firm recover its FC.
This is not to say that consumers are entirely insensitive to FC and opposed to paying higher prices to sellers with sizable start-up costs or overhead. Consider Thaler's notion of transaction utility illustrated in the now classic "beer on the beach" scenario (Thaler 1985 (Thaler , 1999 . In Thaler's experiment, respondents stated a higher willingness to pay or reservation price for a beer when it came from a fancy hotel than when it came from a run down grocer, despite the fact that the consumption experience would be identical and there was no chance for negotiation. This example is cited frequently to illustrate the effect of a reference price on willingness to pay, as beer typically is perceived to be higher-priced at hotels than grocery stores. Intuition suggests that fancy hotels have higher FC, but in Thaler's experiments respondents never described what influenced their reservation price. Of course, consumers can be more or less sensitive to either type of cost, particularly when one is especially salient. We argue that, ceteris paribus, buyers are more sensitive to, and feel more personally responsible for compensating the seller for VC than FC. The studies reported below support our thesis.
Overview
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Study 1 consists of two parts that are exploratory in nature and utilize a within-subjects design. The study tests our prediction that consumers are indeed more likely to perceive a failure to pay for a product with a relatively high VC as inflicting a loss, while a failure to pay for a product with a relatively high FC is more likely to be seen as causing the seller to forego a gain.
Consistent with Prospect Theory, respondents see failing pay for a product as doing more harm when the VC is high (loss), and less harm when the FC is high (foregone gain), and therefore they report being less likely to evade payment when the VC is high and the FC is low, and being more likely to avoid paying when the VC is low and the FC is high.
While participants compare different cost structure scenarios directly in Study 1,
in Study 2 we test the effect of cost structure on payment intentions utilizing a betweensubject design. In addition, rather than vary the VC and FC, we simply reframe costs as either entirely FC or VC, holding AC constant. In this way, we demonstrate the robustness of the effect while illustrating one of the practical aspects of this research:
firms can often reframe costs to consumers in an effort to make them feel more accountable. Study 2 also provides significant evidence of the mediating effect of the harm consumers believe they would inflict by not paying on their payment intention.
Finally, in Study 3, we illustrate how increasing the perceived VC in the mind of the consumer can lead to an increase in the harm consumer believe they would cause a seller by taking and not paying for a product. For half of the participants, we made the ability to produce infinite quantities of a program at no cost conspicuous by allowing them to download the software themselves. The other half were handed a disk with the same software preloaded. Those who downloaded the program viewed not paying for the product they kept as inflicting less harm, and were less likely to pay (real money) than those who were handed a disk with the program already on it.
It appears that by simply changing the way in which software is distributed, a firm can alter consumers' perceptions of the harm associated with failing to pay for the program and thus their payment intentions. Hence our psychological explanation for intellectual property theft leads to prescriptions for how such behavior might be minimized using novel marketing (i.e., economic and psychological) means rather than further legislation and stricter enforcement. We conclude the paper by discussing some of the limitations of this work, as well as avenues for future research. We also discuss its implications for marketing managers and offer some suggestions for changing both consumers' perceptions and behavior toward products with relatively low VC and high FC.
Throughout this paper, we use the term "payment intention" to describe the price a consumer would willingly pay for a product if not obligated to pay anything. Payment intention is conceptually different from "willingness-to-pay," as the latter typically refers to the notion of reservation price, or the most a consumer would pay. A consumer may be willing to pay more, but may not intend, or offer voluntarily to do so. Payment intention is meant to capture what they would freely offer to pay, not necessarily the most they would pay. Ultimately, if we can affect what people think is appropriate to pay for intellectual property, this work may present a more effective method of assuring compliance than additional legal recourse. While our proposed explanation certainly does not wholly account for all such behavior, it appears to be a major contributing factor.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we explore how different cost structures lead consumers to make vastly different inferences regarding their ability to harm a seller by depriving them of what they are due. This study tests the contingent relationship between cost structure and perceived harm inflicted (i.e., the feeling of having taken something from someone, including the ability to sell that something to someone else). It also examines the relationship between the perceived harm to the seller and the consumer's intention to pay (or not to pay). Its purpose is primarily to confirm our prediction that not paying for something with a high VC is seen as inflicting greater harm to a seller than failing to pay for something with a high FC, and therefore consumers are more apt to pay when the VC is high, all else equal.
Method
The study is comprised of two parts each consisting of a separate scenario-based questionnaire. Participants in the first part of the study were 128 undergraduate business students enrolled in an introductory marketing course at a major West Coast university.
Participants in the second part were 119 students from the same pool of students who had not participated in Part 1. Throughout the study, we openly provided all of the cost information to prevent respondents from drawing their own idiosyncratic conclusions about costs. Participants were told the FC, VC and the total expected number of users, from which they could easily derive the AC.
In Part 1, the scenario instructed respondent to imagine they were in need of a certain product (software), which they could take without paying (e.g. shareware).
Participants read the following:
You are learning Russian and need a word processing program that includes the Cyrillic alphabet called RussianStar. You search the Internet and find that the program can be downloaded from the web site of a software vendor. When you are about to download the program, you see the following message: "If you download this software, we ask that you register your copy for $75."
The message includes information on how to pay the vendor. However, a friend has told you that you can actually download the program and use it forever without paying the $75.
You remember reading in a computer magazine that about 10,000 copies of RussianStar are expected to be downloaded from this web site. You've also learned about the costs of the program to the software vendor. Consider the two alternative scenarios below:
Respondents then read both a high-FC/low-VC scenario and a high-VC/low-FC scenario. In both cases, the total cost ($610,000) and AC ($61) to the provider of the software they required was identical.
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Scenario A. The software vendor paid the original programmers of RussianStar an initial royalty of $600,000. That was a one-time lump sum payment that would not change no matter how many copies of the program are downloaded. In addition, for every copy of the program downloaded, the software vendor has to pay the original RussianStar programmers an additional royalty of $1.
Scenario B. The software vendor paid the original programmers of RussianStar an initial royalty of $10,000. That was a one-time lump sum payment that would not change no matter how many copies of the program are downloaded. In addition, for every copy of the program downloaded, the software vendor has to pay the original RussianStar programmers an additional royalty of $60.
Notice that in Scenario A, the product had a high FC and a low VC, and in Scenario B the exact opposite was true. Each respondent was asked the following four questions: The scenarios were rotated and the question order was counterbalanced. Based on our principal hypothesis, we made the following predictions for this study. In the high FC scenario (A), participants would be more likely to perceive a failure to pay as a foregone gain to the vendor as opposed to a loss, while in the high VC scenario (B), participants would be more likely to perceive a failure to pay as a loss to the vendor. Therefore, in accordance with Prospect Theory, participants would think that they would cause less harm to the vendor in the high-FC scenario (A) than the high-VC scenario (B), and therefore would be more likely to download the program without paying in the high-FC scenario (A) than in the high-VC scenario (B). The data were coded using dummy variables such that, if a participant responded as predicted, the response was coded as a "1," otherwise a "0." Similarly, those who stated that they would cause more harm, and were more likely to evade payment, in the high VC scenario were coded as a "1."
In Part 2 of Study 1, we utilize the fundamental design of Part 1 within a different context while employing a more conservative method of arriving at variable and fixed cost. In Part 2, the cost sustained by the seller is actually higher in the high FC scenario (A) than in the high VC scenario (B). Yet, in both scenarios, the seller expects the participant to pay the exact same amount. If respondents were sympathetic to the seller's expenses, regardless of their origin, they should be more willing to pay in the high-FC scenario where the total costs and AC are actually higher than in the high-VC scenario.
Our cost structure hypothesis predicts the opposite result. In part 2, each participant read the following:
It is 8:01 PM now. A popular singer invited by the student association of your university has just started a concert in a big lecture hall. There are roughly 100 students in there. Every person who attends the concert is supposed to pay the student association $15 at the gate. You are interested in attending the concert, but don't have any cash on you. Because the concert has already started and it is unlikely that more people will show up, the person who collected money at the door has just left. So, you can safely enter the lecture hall without paying the $15 and nobody will ever catch you.
They then read two alternative cost structure scenarios that manipulated the cost structure by the way in which the student association paid the singer.
Scenario A. The student association will pay the singer a lump sum of $2,000. The singer will not charge the student association any more or less than that amount no matter how many people enter the lecture hall and attend the concert. Scenario B. An automatic counter at the door (as seen in supermarkets) counts the number of people who enter the lecture hall to attend the concert. For every single person who enters, the singer will charge the student association $15.
Participants were then asked in which scenario they would be more likely to enter the lecture hall without paying, in addition to questions regarding framing and perceived harm just as in Part I. Note that there was only a FC and no VC in Scenario A, and only a VC, and no FC in Scenario B. The product (a concert) was identical in both scenarios.
What differed was only how the student association was billed: either strictly in terms of VC ($15 per student), or strictly in terms of a FC (a lump sum of $2,000). The actual cost the student association had to sustain, both in total and per attendee (AC), was higher in Scenario A where the student association paid $2,000. If the respondent were to enter, there would be 101 people in the audience, implying the student association would pay roughly $19.80 per head. In Scenario B, the student association pays $15 per student, or $1,515 for 101 attendees. In either scenario, the student association expects the participant to pay only $15. If asking price ($15) were all that mattered, there would be no difference between the scenarios. If AC were all that mattered, respondents should be more inclined to pay in Scenario A. However, if our hypothesis is correct, participants should be more inclined to pay when the VC is relatively high, as it is in Scenario B.
Results and Discussion
There were no significant effects based on the order of the questions, so the data in each part were combined and analyzed as such. The percentage of respondents choosing each option is summarized in Table 1 . As expected, when the primary cost of the RussianStar software was described as its initial investment (FC), the vast majority of the respondents perceived a failure to pay as a foregone gain to the vendor or lost profits.
Similarly, when the primary cost of the software was described as a sizable royalty (VC), a significant majority of the respondents perceived a failure to pay as a loss to the vendor.
Also as predicted and in conformance with Prospect Theory, respondents who perceived a failure to pay in the high VC scenario as a loss also believed it would cause more harm (χ2 = 55.97, p < 0.001), and were less likely to download the software without paying (χ2 = 55.97, p < 0.001). In addition, those who perceived a failure to pay in the high VC as a loss were also highly likely to see a failure to pay in the high FC as a foregone gain (χ2 = 54.00, p < 0.001).
__________________________
Insert Table 1 about here
In part 2, the general results again supported our predictions (see Table 1 ),
replicating the principal findings of part 1, while at the same time proving stronger support in two ways. First, the choice proportions in the direction of our prediction were even larger. Second, the preference for the high-VC option had to overcome a total-cost advantage of the high-FC option. Again, those who perceived a failure to pay in the high VC scenario as a loss also believed it would cause more harm (χ2 = 24.05, p < 0.001), and were less likely to enter the theater without paying (χ2 = 39.18, p < 0.001). Once more, those who perceived a failure to pay in the high VC scenario as a loss were very likely to see a failure to pay in the high FC as a foregone gain (χ2 = 42.23, p < 0.001).
Taken together, the results from parts 1 & 2 of Study 1 show that, holding the total cost (and therefore AC) of a product constant, cost structure has a significant impact on the harm consumers believe not paying would inflict, and their intentions to pay. It seems clear that people view costs differently depending on whether they are directly and explicitly associated with individual-level consumption (VC), or whether they are part of what can be construed as the cost (FC) of doing business. It also appears that people feel failing to pay VC inflicts more harm, and are therefore more likely to pay those costs that they associate with the specific unit they use or possess. While Study 1 confirms our predictions, due to our reliance on discrete measures (i.e., in which scenario are you more likely to download the program…), we were not able to effectively test for the mediating effect of perceived harm directly. However, we do so in Study 2, while testing our thesis more conclusively using continuous measures and a between-subjects design.
STUDY 2
In Study 1, both cost structure scenarios were given to the same participants. This draws attention to the difference in cost structure and might result in demand effects. In this study, we wanted to see whether we would obtain the same effect of cost structure with a between-subject manipulation. Moreover, the cost structure manipulation in Study 2 is far subtler than in Study 1. In this study, we merely reframe costs; in one case describing the seller as charging an intermediary for something tailored to the individual consumer and hence more VC-like, while in the other case the seller charges one set fee, and hence the same cost is more FC-like. In addition, in Study 2 our dependent variable is a direct measure of payment intentions for a product and service bundle.
Method
Participants in this study were 200 undergraduate students from a large West Coast university. Respondents were asked to imagine the following:
A few weeks ago a student organization at your university invited a Chinese chess player to give a lecture on how to play Chinese chess. One hundred people, which includes you, attended the talk. The talk lasted one hour and at the end the speaker gave each attendee a Chinese chess set.
The student organization did not charge attendees anything on the day of the talk, but now hopes that attendees will pay retroactively. The organization does not specify the amount of payment, but asks each attendee to pay the amount they deem appropriate.
It was explained to respondents that Xianqi, or Chinese chess, should not to be confused with Chinese checkers and it is not the same as western chess, although the two are similar in many respects. 5 The cost structure manipulation was achieved by varying the way the chess player charged the student organization. Half of the participants (those in the high FC condition) were told:
The speaker charged the student organization $1,000 for his talk but did not charge them anything for the Chinese chess sets.
The other half of the respondents (in the VC condition) were told:
The speaker did not charge the student organization anything for his talk, but charged them $10 for each of the 100 Chinese chess sets.
We hypothesized that the total cost of the chess sets would be perceived as more dependent on individual attendees, and thus more like a VC. The talk, on the other hand, would be delivered regardless of how many people attended, and hence its cost would be perceived as more like a FC. In other words, the cost structure manipulation in this study is essentially a framing manipulation -whether the cost is allocated to the individual attendees vis-à-vis the chess sets, or to the group as a whole. Both groups of participants were then queried:
You attended the talk and received a Chinese chess set from the speaker. How much would you pay if you could pay anything you desire and your payment was anonymous?
First, they were given four discrete choices: $0, $5, $10, and "more than $10," and asked to circle the one that came closest to what they would be willing to pay. They were then asked to specify the exact amount they would pay, as well as what they thought the average student would pay. We predicted that respondents in the FC condition (where the speaker charged for the talk) would be less likely to pay, or would pay less than those in the VC condition (where the speaker charged for the chess sets).
Finally, participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale the loss (1= "no loss" and 7 = "a significant loss") they would inflict on the student organization if they failed to pay anything at all. They also indicated to what extent failing to pay would deprive the organization of what it was due for arranging the speaker (1 = "to a great extent" and 7 = "not at all"). The second item was reverse scored and the two items were averaged for a reliable scale of "perceived harm" (r = 0.84, p < 0.001). We expected those respondents in the high-VC condition feel as if they would inflict a greater loss and deprive the seller to a greater extent. In addition, individual difference measures of age and gender were also collected.
Results and Discussion
The percentage of respondents in each condition that chose each payment option and the average amount they would be willing to pay if they could name their price are summarized in Table 2 . As predicted, those in the FC condition, on average, chose to pay smaller amounts than those in the VC condition (χ 2 = 19.72, p < 0.001). Note how the percentage of people not willing to pay anything ($0) was more than five times as large in the FC condition (55%) than in the VC condition (10%), while those willing to spend $10 and > $10 (i.e., the two choice options combined) was four times as large in the high VC condition (84%) as in the high FC condition (20%).
__________________________
Insert Table 2 about here
The specific amount respondents said they intended to pay were included in a general linear model analysis, which included the cost frame (high FC or high VC) as well as the covariates of gender and age as independent variables. Neither of the individual characteristics was significant so they were dropped from the analysis. The model confirmed the results from our discrete measures (see Table 2 ). When we compare the average amount respondents would pay without being compelled, we see that they would pay significantly more in the high VC cost condition (µ VC = $6.54) than in the high FC condition (µ FC = $4.85, F 1,99 = 1.94, p <0.05). Not surprisingly, participants believed that they would pay more than others who attended the presentation (µ Self = $5.70, µ Others = $3.67, F 1,199 = 1.87, p < 0.01). 6 This difference suggests that respondents were not depending on other attendees to cover any shortfall their own failure to pay might create, as they believed, in general, that they would pay more than others would.
Nevertheless, the amount they believed others would pay was highly correlated with what they said they themselves would pay (r = 0.80).
Finally, if we compare the harm they reported they would cause if they failed to pay, we see that those respondents in the high-VC condition feel as if they would inflict a greater loss (µ VC = 4.02, µ FC = 3.51, t 198 = -2.18, p < 0.05) and deprive the seller to a greater extent (µ VC = 4.63, µ FC = 3.62, t 198 = -2.43, p < 0.01). The combined measure of perceived harm was added to the analysis.
Using the methodology recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) , we tested whether the impact that perceived cost structure had on payment intention was mediated by perceived harm. As shown in Figure 2 , a simple regression model showed that perceived cost had a significant impact on the amount consumers intended to pay. A separate simple regression model confirmed that perceived cost structure significantly affected perceived harm. In turn, perceived harm significantly predicted payment intentions. In a multiple regression model, the predictive power of perceived harm on payment intentions remained high while the predictive power of cost structure on payment intentions dropped substantially (to the point of non-significance), thereby suggesting that perceived harm acted as a mediating variable. We further tested whether perceived harm carries the influence of cost structure to payment intention using the Goodman (I) test discussed in Baron and Kenny (1986) . The indirect effect was found to be statistically significant (z-value = 2.30, p < 0.03).
Insert Figure 2 about here __________________________ In this study, the student organization spent $1,000 for 100 attendees in both conditions, and it should be irrelevant whether that money went to cover the cost of the talk or the cost of the chess sets. Either way, the respondent received both: they sat in on the talk and received a Chinese chess set. But they were willing to pay 35% more to the student organization when the speaker was paid for the sets than when he was paid for the talk. This study also demonstrates that a failure to pay for a good with a high VC is perceived as inflicting greater harm to the provider even if the total cost and average cost are the same. Again, there appears to be a sense that consumers should cover the cost that can be ascribed to their individual consumption.
Perhaps, for some goods, respondents might assume the firm can recoup FC by selling these assets or through tax savings by depreciating their assets and other investments considered FC. However, in our scenario the FC is a service fee, which already has been paid to the speaker. There is nothing left to sell or depreciate. When informally queried, a number of respondents in the high FC condition suggested that the speaker's fee was not something they felt responsible for. This attitude may be a remnant of a more general philosophy that one should pay for what one takes, and that there is a cost to the firm (or student organization) of doing business, presumably a FC. It is not impossible that respondents in the high FC condition felt others were more responsible for covering the speaker's fee. If so, they didn't expect their cohorts to live up to their responsibility; as they predicted others would pay even less than they did.
STUDY 3
Study 3 was designed to add further realism to our experiments by allowing participants to express their intent to pay with real money, which would otherwise stay in their wallets. In this study, instead of manipulating the cost structure of a product and communicating these costs directly, we manipulated peoples' perceptions of the cost structure by making it especially salient to half of our participants that the VC associated with the product in question is essentially $0. We reason that if people copy a computer file themselves, it is transparent that the VC of what they get is $0. But if people get a pre-made disk, they are more likely to spontaneously amortize the FC of the program into their copy and perceive the seller's cost as higher. Therefore, this latter group is more likely see a failure to pay for the good as depriving the seller of something or inflicting harm, and consequently would be both more willing to pay and willing to pay more than the group that downloaded the program. This study should be of particular interest to sellers of information goods and digital products, especially those who sell their wares over the Internet, as it illustrates how channels of distribution might influence buyers'
inferences regarding cost and therefore payment intentions.
Method
Respondents were 140 undergraduate business students from a major West coast university who were compensated to participate in this and a number of other studies.
Students arrived in groups of 20 to 40 at a computer lab at pre-assigned times. They then completed a series of paper and pencil tasks as well as another computer-based study before this experiment began. At the conclusion of those tasks, participants received an envelope with $6.00 in promised compensation: three $1 bills, eight quarters, five dimes and ten nickels.
They were also told that they would receive a copy of a computer game (called Five) created by a programmer who was not the experimenter, and who had invested $500 in time developing the software to be given as a premium to research participants. It was explained that 100 people would participate in the experiment and each would receive the game in addition to the promised compensation. They were shown how the game was played on a video screen in the front of the room, and were given the opportunity to try the game themselves on the computer terminal in front of them.
At the end of the study, half of all participants (70) were given a blank disk and instructed to download the game onto the disk. The other half were given a disk with the game already on it, and told that the experimenter (not the programmer) had already copied the game onto the disk. Entire groups of respondents either downloaded the software or received a disk (i.e., both never occurred simultaneously). In this way, the ability to create endless copies of the game (i.e., a VC of $0) was made especially salient to those who downloaded the program.
Participants were told that if they wanted to, they could put some money into a second envelope that was provided, which would go entirely to the programmer as compensation for the game. It was made explicit that all of the funds they provided would go to the programmer (and not the experimenter) such that participants would not feel compelled to compensate the experimenter for downloading the software onto the disk on their behalf. They were also told that they were not in any way obligated to pay, and that they should take the game regardless of how much they chose to pay, if anything.
As all of the participants previously had agreed to participate in a follow-up email study, each received a series of questions one week later. Each participant was asked to recall how much they had paid if anything. They were also provided a series of statements with which they either agreed or disagreed and indicated to what extent on a 7-point scale, where 7 indicated complete agreement. First, they were asked whether people who had not paid the full AC of $5 had deprived the programmer of anything. As no one paid close to that amount (the maximum was $1.10), respondents were in fact describing their own behavior when they responded.
Next, they were asked whether they believed not paying the $5 AC had caused the programmer to incur a loss. They were also asked whether not paying made the programmer worse off, and whether those who kept the disk without paying the full amount had "taken" anything from the programmer. Again, recall that no respondent paid close to $5 and every respondent took home a disk. They were also asked to assess the quality of the game on a 7-point scale where 7 meant "superior" and 1 meant "inferior."
We hypothesized a priori that those who downloaded the game themselves would be less likely to believe that they were depriving the programmer of anything. Conversely, we expected those who received a disk with the game already on it to feel more obligated to pay and to pay more. This group had not personally copied the program and it would be less evident how the variable cost involved in providing an additional copy was essentially zero (i.e., the price of a blank disk).
Results and Discussion
First and foremost, significantly more participants chose not to pay the programmer anything ($0) when they downloaded the software themselves (54%) versus when they were handed a disk (37%) and this difference is significant (z = 2.07, p < 0.05). In other words, 63% voluntarily paid something when handed a disk versus 46% of those who downloaded the software themselves. And, as expected, those who were Not surprisingly, all those who remembered incorrectly said they had paid more than they actually did.
When asked whether paying less than the average cost of $5 deprived the seller of anything, those who were handed a disk were more likely to agree (µ handed = 4.39 vs.
µ download = 3.59, t = 3.04, p < 0.01). Similarly, when asked whether or not paying $5
caused the programmer to incur a loss, those handed a disk were more likely to agree (µ handed = 4.35 vs. µ download = 3.11, t = 4.58, p < 0.01). Those who were handed a disk also were more likely to see not paying as making the programmer worse off (µ handed = 4.98
vs. µ download = 3.50, t = 2.02, p < 0.05), and to believe that they had taken something (µ handed = 4.28 vs. µ download = 3.91, t = 1.51, p = 0.06). Taken together, the results from the follow-up survey suggest that participants were less likely to believe that they were depriving the programmer of something when they downloaded the software themselves than when they were handed a disk. Finally, there was no difference in the perceived quality of the video game across conditions (µ handed = 3.85 vs. µ download = 3.73, t = 0.52, p = 0.30).
In study 3, by making the programmer's ability to produce and distribute copies of the game without cost more salient, we were able to influence how much respondents were willing to pay for the software. In addition, the method of delivering the product also influenced how much harm participants believed they inflicted if they paid less than the ideal amount ($5, the average cost as described in the e-mail survey). Hence, making it clear that the VC was essentially $0 decreased the perceived harm associated with taking the program and not paying, and lowered payment intention measured with actual cash outlays. The implication for software vendors seems straightforward. Distributing software over the Internet may reduce distribution costs, but it can also degrade the value of the product in the consumer's mind by making the fact that the VC is essentially $0 especially salient to consumers.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The objective of this research was to demonstrate how a product's perceived "cost structure" affects consumers' inclination to pay such that consumers feel less obligated and are less likely to pay voluntarily for a product that entails high FC and low VC (e.g., software) as compared to a product with a high VC and low FC (e.g., jewelry). To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this article is the first to examine the effect of a product's cost structure on consumer judgment and decision-making. It shows that consumers are much less intent on paying for, or willing to pay less for products with relatively low VC and high FC, such as information products, than products with a high VC-to-FC ratio, such as more conventional tangible products. This finding can help explain why ordinarily law-abiding people are more likely to risk stealing intangible products than material goods.
Study 1 illustrates how consumers perceive not paying for something with a high VC inflicts greater harm to a seller than failing to pay for something with a high FC. This is due to amounts paid in excess of VC being seen as a gain to the seller, while failing to cover the seller's VC would be seen as inflicting a loss. The results show how consumers are more likely to pay for a product the more harm they perceive not paying would cause.
Study 2 further shows that a failure to pay for a good with a high VC is perceived as inflicting greater harm, even when the same total cost simply is reframed as having a higher VC and lower FC. In addition, Study 2 provides direct evidence of the mediating effect of the harm consumers believe they would inflict by not paying on their payment intentions. In Study 3, the extent to which the VC component of a computer game is near $0 is made especially salient to one group by having them download the game themselves. They were found to less willing to pay, and would pay less for the game than a separate group who received the game already loaded on a disk, even though costs never changed (FC were $500, with 100 copies being distributed for an AC of $5). Study 3 adds a degree of realism by having participants spend their own money.
Limitations & Implications
The studies are not without their limitations. In Study 1 and Study 2, we prompt respondents to think about costs explicitly through our manipulations of cost structure, while in Study 3 FC are announced, and the cost structure is not varied; instead the near-$0 VC is made more salient. While this research assumes consumers are conscious of the fact that most information goods (software, music CDs), most services and many conventional goods (e.g., pharmaceuticals) have relatively low VC, future research could examine when consumers spontaneously consider costs while assessing payment intentions and willingness-to-pay.
One of the major changes that the computer era and information age has brought about is in the products we see and use. More and more of those products consist almost exclusively of intellectual property, including software, music on CDs, movies on DVD and a host of products and services available online through the Internet. A key difference between these information products and tangible, material products is often their cost structure. Information products typically have a relatively high FC and little or no VC, which is made particularly salient through online delivery.
Our research may help provide alternatives to the costly enforcement associated with legal remedies by provided practical ideas for ways in which firms may foster greater payment intentions among consumers. One prescription for marketers (manufacturers and sellers) of products with high FC is to better communicate a more accurate representation of total costs to the consumer. For example, firms with large research and development budgets (e.g., pharmaceutical companies) may consider communicating that, say $20 million worth of research went into bringing a particular product to market. The firm may go even further and translate FC into VC for the consumer, stating that amortized FC would approach $100 per bottle. In situations where the seller can easily frame the cost either as a fixed lump sum or a per-person charge, such as in the concert study and the Chinese chess study, our findings suggest that it is better for the seller to frame the cost as a per-person charge.
Another method for increasing consumers' payment and purchase intention is simply to increase the recognizable VC, and therefore increase the VC-to-FC ratio.
Suppose, for example, a toy company invented a game, and that this company possessed the exclusive right to manufacture the game. Imagine also that a basic set (the board plus the pieces) is made of plastic and costs only $2 to produce, but that the game company spent a fortune designing the game (or buying the rights). In order to recoup the large FC, they must set the price of the game at a minimum of $22 -$20 for recouping the FC and $2 for the VC (board and pieces) before they could make any profits. In this scenario, chances are that consumers would not be very happy with the price. They may ask themselves, "Why would I pay $20 for some cheap plastic pieces?" One way to make the consumer less averse towards paying for the FC is to simply increase the VC.
Instead of using plastic that costs only $2 per set, they might consider using mahogany that costs $40 per set. This will bring the VC-to-FC ratio from $2:$20 to $40:$20, and bring the price from $2+$20=$22 to $40+$20=$60. Even if the price is much higher now, consumers may actually be happier with price. In other words, charging $60 for a product whose VC is $40 may be looked upon more favorably than charging $22 for a product whose VC is only $2, holding the amortized FC constant.
Consider the Monopoly Deluxe addition ($19.99) with its wooden houses and hotels and the Heirloom Edition ($105), with its Mahogany case and brass pieces. While these products may appeal to those with higher reservation prices (premium pricing à la Tellis 1986), they may also attract consumers who believe $14.99 is too much to pay for all of the cardboard and plastic in the standard edition. Obviously, a downside of this strategy is that there will be fewer customers who can afford a more expensive game. But we would argue that the seller should consider both the elasticity of demand and the VC-to-FC ratio simultaneously when setting a list price or developing a product line. Similarly, when software is packaged with pre-printed manuals and other accouterments, it not only changes the VC-to-FC ratio, but raises the VC above $0. There appears to be a qualitative difference between $0 VC and some VC, as illustrated in Study 3.
Finally, we believe our research has important implications for perceptions of a fair price. This work finds that consumers consider the ramification of their actions to the extent that their failure to pay would cause the seller to incur a loss versus a foregone gain. Prospect Theory suggests the differential impact is due to loss aversion, such that the loss of a certain amount is psychologically more influential than foregoing an equivalent gain. In all of our experiments, the impact of failing to pay is negative and the unpaid revenues are equivalent. Yet, in each, we measured self-assessments of the impact of not paying on the seller, but not whether one pricing structure was perceived as fairer or differently in other ways. People are often unwilling to pay a price they deem unfair (Martins and Monroe 1994, Urbany, Madden and Dickson 1989) , though research on the specific determinants of price fairness is sparse (Bolton, Warlop and Alba 2003) .
Much of what consumers perceive to be fair has been shown to depend on how they believe prices, and a firm's motive for charging those prices, affect firm or producer profitability (Campbell 1999) . A price increase, absent an increase in cost, increases profits and is seen as less fair than a price increase associated with a cost increase (Campbell 1999, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986a, b) . We speculate that what people believe to be the fair price of a product also depends on its cost structure.
Furthermore, we suspect that the relationship between payment intention (the construct we study in this paper) and perceived fair price is that the latter is the upper bound of the former. That is, people would not be willing to voluntarily pay more for a product than what they consider to be the fair price of that product. Future research could develop further how cost structure influences perceptions of fairness as well as other inherent factors associated with the VC-FC cost structure distinction we created.
ENDNOTES
1. How people perceive change relative to a reference point as described by Prospect Theory typically involves losses or foregone gains incurred by the decision maker, not a third party. We assume that consumers are also subject to framing effects for outcomes that occur to others (i.e., a failure to pay the firm can be subject to these framing effects).
2. In Cost-plus pricing, also called "markup pricing," the seller adds a standard markup to the product's cost.
3. As one reviewer pointed out, a key difference between software and more tangible goods like jewelry may be the counterfactual that gets created in the mind of the consumer. A consumer might tell herself that she would not buy the software would she need to pay for it. Therefore, to some consumers, taking a piece of jewelry is seen as precluding the seller from selling that jewelry to someone else (a loss), while taking the software neither deprives the seller of the sale to the thief, or to someone else (neither a loss of foregone gain). Hence, we carefully control for this in our experiments. Of course, there are many consumers who take software they would have otherwise bought, which is the focus of this work.
4. In our calculation of AC we implicitly assume in the scenario that all people who download will pay. Of course, violations of this assumption make the AC higher in the high-FC/low-VC condition. We also assume that people can and will divide the FC by the number of users.
5. While Chinese chess has a rook, a king, a pawn and a bishop, each which occupy the same place on the board and have the same movement as the predecessor of western chess, differences include a river, a cannon, a knight that cannot jump, and the fact that pieces are placed on points rather than squares. 
